Probably Approximately Correct Nash Equilibrium Learning by Fele, Filiberto & Margellos, Kostas
1Probably Approximately Correct
Nash Equilibrium Learning
Filiberto Fele and Kostas Margellos
Abstract—We consider a multi-agent noncooperative game
with agents’ objective functions being affected by uncertainty.
Following a data driven paradigm, we represent uncertainty by
means of scenarios and seek a robust Nash equilibrium solution.
We first show how to overcome differentiability issues, arising due
to the introduction of scenarios, and compute a Nash equilibrium
solution in a decentralized manner. We then treat the Nash
equilibrium computation problem within the realm of probably
approximately correct (PAC) learning. Building upon recent
developments in scenario-based optimization, we accompany
the computed Nash equilibrium with a priori and a posteriori
probabilistic robustness certificates, providing confidence that the
computed equilibrium remains unaffected (in probabilistic terms)
when a new uncertainty realization is encountered. For a wide
class of games, we also show that the computation of the so
called compression set — which is at the core of the scenario
approach theory — can be directly obtained as a byproduct of
the proposed solution methodology. We demonstrate the efficacy
of the proposed approach in an electric vehicle charging control
problem.
Index Terms—Nash equilibrium computation, Noncooperative
min-max games, Scenario-based optimization, Variational in-
equalities, Electric vehicles.
I. INTRODUCTION
GAME theory has attracted significant attention in thecontrol systems community [1], as it has found numer-
ous applications in smart grid, transportation and IT infrastruc-
tures [2]–[6]. Nash equilibrium (NE) computation is a central
component in this context, allowing to determine no-regret
strategies for noncooperative, selfish agents [7], [8], [9]. As a
result, NE has been a popular solution concept for multi-agent
distributed and decentralized control architectures, as they
naturally lend themselves to price-based implementations [10].
Following the seminal work of Wardrop [11], several results
have studied such problems, investigating also the connections
with social welfare optima [4], [12]–[15].
The aforementioned results in the literature consider a
deterministic setting where the systems conditions (e.g., prices
in an incentive scheme) are assumed to be known in advance.
Such an assumption is not reflected in realistic applications
of contemporary interest [16]–[18], where uncertainty might
be present. Indeed, since complete knowledge of the game
was questioned in [19], uncertainty has been widely addressed
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in noncooperative games, by adopting stochastic or worst-
case approaches. In the first case, both chance-constrained
(risk-averse) [20], [21] or expected payoff criteria [22]–[26]
have been considered. However, the aforementioned methods
impose certain assumptions on the underlying probability
distribution of the uncertainty. In the second case, results
build upon robust control theory [9], [27]; however, to en-
sure tractability certain assumptions on the geometry of the
uncertainty set are imposed (see [16], [28]).
In this paper we consider a multi-agent NE seeking problem
with uncertainty affecting agents’ objective functions. We
depart from existing paradigms and follow a data driven
methodology, where we represent uncertainty by a finite set
of scenarios that could either be extracted from historical
data, or by means of some prediction model (e.g., regres-
sion, Markov chains, neural networks) [29]. Adopting a data
driven methodology poses the following main challenges: Our
problem becomes a min−max game with the maximum
taken with respect to a finite number of scenarios, thus
giving rise to a non-differentiable objective function. As a
consequence, NE are inherently random as they depend on the
extracted scenarios. Therefore, our objective is to investigate
the sensitivity of the resulting NE in a probabilistic sense, or
in other words, accompany the NE with a certificate on the
probability that it will remain unaltered if a new uncertainty
realization (other than those included in the scenarios/data) is
encountered. A similar attempt has been recently noticed in
the literature [30], where the scenario approach is applied to
variational inequalities, widely employed to characterize NE
solutions. Our approach overcomes the challenges outlined
above and extends the results in [30] by performing the
following contributions:
1) We treat the NE computation problem in a probably
approximately correct (PAC) learning framework [31]–[33],
and employ the so called scenario approach [34], which up to
now has been used solely in an optimization context. Using the
recent results in [35] we first provide an a posteriori certificate
on the probability that a NE remains unaltered upon a new
realization of the uncertainty. We then rely on [36] and provide
an a priori probabilistic certificate on the equilibrium sensitiv-
ity. It should be noted that the obtained results are distribution-
free, and as such the underlying probability distribution of the
uncertainty could be unknown and the only requirement is the
availability of samples.
Results in [30] provide guarantees on the probability that
agents’ objective functions do not deteriorate upon a new
uncertainty realization. Here we pose a different learning
problem, i.e., probabilistic NE sensitivity analysis (see Sec-
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2tion II-C), which allows us to obtain the results in [30] as
a byproduct of our analysis. Moreover, the analysis in [30]
is based on a non-degeneracy assumption (see Section II for
a definition) which, unlike convex optimization programs, is
often not satisfied in games; here we relax this assumption
and allow for (possibly) degenerate problem instances.
2) We provide an iterative algorithm for decentralized NE
computation. To achieve this we circumvent the nondiffer-
entiability of the resulting min−max game that prevents
the application of conventional decentralised techniques, by
bridging the results in [37] and [5] that involve resorting to
an augmented min−max game and incorporating an equilib-
rium selection mechanism. The proposed scheme enjoys the
same convergence properties as state-of-the-art decentralized
algorithms for monotone games [5], without however impos-
ing strong monotonicity assumptions on the operator of the
underlying variational inequality as in [30]. The latter would
effectively imply uniqueness of the associated NE, while in our
work we allow for multiple NE (see Section III). Moreover,
despite the conceptually similarities with [38], our results
allow multiple maximisers in the resulting min−max game.
It should be noted that by means of an epigraph reformula-
tion such a min−max problem can be cast into the class of
generalized NE games. However, decentralized solution algo-
rithms for this class of games impose additional assumptions,
e.g., affine coupling constraints [4], [6], [12], which do not
necessarily fit the format of the resulting epigraphic constraint.
3) Under the additional assumption that the game under
consideration admits a unique NE, or for aggregative games
with multiple equilibria but a unique aggregate solution, we
show that a compression set (an essential concept in the
scenario approach theory — see Section II for a definition)
can be directly computed by inspection of the solution re-
turned by the proposed algorithm. This feature has significant
computational advantages as it prevents the use of the greedy
mechanism presented in [35], which would require running up
to numerical convergence multiple times (possibly as many as
the number of samples) a NE computation iterative algorithm
(see Section V).
The rest of the paper unfolds as follows. In Section II
we introduce the scenario-based noncooperative game, pose
the main problem, and present the main results of the paper.
Section III provides a decentralized construction of the NE of
the game under study, while Section IV contains the proof
of the main results. In Section V we provide for a wide
class of games a computationally efficient methodology to
determine an upper bound to the cardinality of the compression
set. Section VI provides a numerical example on an electric-
vehicle charging problem, while Section VII concludes the
paper and provides some directions for future work.
II. SCENARIO BASED MULTI-AGENT GAME
A. Gaming set-up
Let the set N = {1, . . . , N} designate a finite population of
agents. The decision vector, henceforth referred to as strategy,
of each agent i ∈ N is denoted by xi ∈ Rn and should
satisfy individual constraints encoded by the set Xi ⊂ Rn. We
denote by x = (xi)i∈N ∈ X ⊂ RnN the collection of all
agents’ strategies, where X = X1 × · · · × XN .
Let θ be an uncertain vector taking values over some set Θ,
endowed with a σ-algebra Q, where P denotes the probability
measure defined over Q. For all subsequent derivations fix
any M ∈ N, and let {θ1, . . . , θM} ∈ ΘM be a finite
collection of independently and identically distributed (i.i.d.)
scenarios/realizations of the uncertain vector θ, that we will
henceforth designate as an M -multisample. In view of our
data driven robust considerations, we assume that — for given
strategies of the remaining agents x−i — each agent i ∈ N
aims at minimizing with respect to xi the function
Ji(xi, x−i) = fi(xi, x−i) + max
m∈{1,...,M}
g(xi, x−i, θm), (1)
where fi : RnN → R expresses a deterministic component,
different for each agent i but still dependent on the strategies
of all agents, while g : RnN × Θ → R encodes the
component of the objective function that depends on the
uncertain vector. Agents are considered to be selfish, thus
interested in minimizing their local objective fi; at the same
time, they seek to minimize the worst-case (maximum) value
g can take among a finite set of scenarios. As the latter is
common to all agents it entails a certain level of cooperation
between them. The electric vehicle charging control problem
of Section VI provides a natural interpretation of such a set-
up, where electric vehicles are selfish entities each one with a
possibly different utility function fi; however, they could be
participating in the same aggregation plan or belonging to a
centrally managed fleet, thus giving rise to a common g. Here,
the fact that g is influenced by uncertainty accounts for price
volatility.
We consider a noncooperative game among the N agents,
described by the tuple G = 〈N , (Xi)i∈N , (Ji)i∈N , {θm}Mm=1〉,
where N is the set of agents/players, Xi, Ji are respectively
the strategy set and the cost function for each agent i ∈ N , and
{θ1, . . . , θM} is a finite collection of samples. We consider the
following solution concept for G:
Definition 1 (Nash equilibrium). Let Ω ⊆ X denote the set
of Nash equilibria of G, defined as
Ω =
{
x∗ = (x∗i )i∈N ∈ X :
x∗i ∈ arg min
xi∈Xi
Ji(xi, x
∗
−i), ∀i ∈ N
}
. (2)
We impose the following standing assumptions:
Assumption 2. For every fixed θ ∈ Θ, and every x−i ∈ X−i =
Πj 6=i∈NXj , fi(·, x−i)+g(·, x−i, θ) is convex and continuously
differentiable, while the local constraint set Xi is nonempty,
compact and convex for all i ∈ N . Moreover, the pseudo-
gradient (∇xifi(x))Ni=1 is monotone with constant χf ∈ R,
while ∇xg(x, θ) is monotone with constant χg ∈ R for any
fixed θ, i.e., for any u, v ∈ RnN , and any θ ∈ Θ,
(u− v)ᵀ((∇uifi(u))Ni=1 − (∇vifi(v))Ni=1) ≥ χf‖u− v‖2,
(u− v)ᵀ(∇ug(u, θ)−∇vg(v, θ)) ≥ χg‖u− v‖2, (3)
and χf + χg ≥ 0.
3Assumption 3. Let Dx ⊆ RnN be an open convex set
such that X ⊂ Dx. For every θ ∈ Θ, the function g is
twice differentiable on Dx and, for each i ∈ N , fi is twice
differentiable on Dx.
Remark 4. It should be noted that we only need that
fi(·, x−i)+g(·, x−i, θ) is convex for any fixed x−i, without re-
quiring that both fi(·, x−i) and g(·, x−i, θ) are simultaneously
convex. The monotonicity requirements of Assumption 2 are
needed in the proof of Lemma 15, where it is shown that an op-
erator underlying a given variational inequality is monotone,
and they are standard in the game theoretic literature [37].
Notice also that it is not required that both χf , χg are non-
negative, but only χf +χg ≥ 0. These conditions are satisfied
in the electric vehicle example of Section VI. A sufficient (but
stronger) condition for the monotonicity requirements to be
satisfied is for fi + g to be jointly convex with respect to all
xi, i ∈ N .
B. Problem statement
As every NE x∗ ∈ Ω is a random vector due to its
dependency on the M -multisample, a question that naturally
arises is how sensitive a NE is against a new realization of the
uncertainty not included in the samples. To provide a rigorous
answer to this question we will study the generalization prop-
erties of x∗ within a probably approximately correct (PAC)
learning framework. To this end, let x∗ ∈ Ω be a NE of the
game with M samples, and consider a new extraction θ ∈ Θ.
Let G+ = 〈N , (Xi)i∈N , (Ji)i∈N , {θm}Mm=1 ∪ {θ}〉 be a game
defined over the M +1 scenarios {θ1, . . . , θM , θ}, and denote
by Ω+ the set of the associated NE. Then, for all x∗ ∈ Ω, let
V (x∗) = P{θ ∈ Θ: x∗ /∈ Ω+} (4)
denote the probability that a NE of G does not remain a NE of
G+, i.e., of the game characterized by the extraction of an ad-
ditional sample. Note that V (x∗) is in turn a random variable,
as its argument depends on the multisample {θ1, . . . , θM}.
Within the realm of a PAC learning framework, with a given
confidence/probability with respect to the product measure
PM (as the samples are extracted in an i.i.d. fashion), we
aim at quantifying V (x∗).
To achieve such a characterization we provide some basic
definitions. Let Φ: ΘM → Ω be a single-valued mapping from
the set of M -multisamples to the set of equilibria of G.
Remark 5. It should be noted that the definition of the game
G, the set of NE Ω, the mapping Φ (as well as of other
associated quantities introduced in the sequel) depends on M
via the M -multisample employed. Therefore, they should be
parameterized by M , thus giving rise to a family of games, NE
sets and mappings. To simplify notation we do not show this
dependency explicitly. Moreover, the dimension of the domain
of Φ varies according to M and it is to be understood that
it is in accordance with the number of samples Φ takes as
arguments.
Definition 6 (Support sample [36]). Fix any i.i.d. M -
multisample (θ1, . . . , θM ) ∈ ΘM , and let x∗ = Φ(θ1, . . . , θM )
be a NE of G. Let x◦ = Φ(θ1, . . . , θs−1, θs+1, . . . , θM ) be the
solution obtained by discarding the sample θs. We call the
latter a support sample if x◦ 6= x∗.
Definition 7 (Compression set — adapted from [35]). Fix
any i.i.d. M -multisample (θ1, . . . , θM ) ∈ ΘM , and let x∗ =
Φ(θ1, . . . , θM ) be a NE of G. Consider any subset C ⊆
{θ1, . . . , θM} and let x◦ = Φ(C). We call C a compression
set if x◦ = x∗.
The notion of compression set has appeared in the literature
under different names; its properties are studied in full detail
in [35], where it is designated as support subsample. Here
we adopt the term compression set as in [31], [33] to avoid
confusion with Definition 6.
Let C(θ1, . . . , θM ) be the collection of all compression sets
associated with the M -multisample {θ1, . . . , θM}. We refer to
the compression cardinality d∗ as the cardinality |C| of some
compression set C ∈ C(θ1, . . . , θM ). Note that C — hence
also d∗ — is itself a random variable as it depends on the
M -multisample.
Definition 8 (Non-degeneracy — adapted from [39]). For any
M ∈ N, with PM -probability 1, the NE x∗ = Φ(θ1, . . . , θM )
coincides with the NE returned by the associated mapping
when the latter takes as argument only the support samples.
The corresponding game is then said to be non-degenerate; in
the opposite case it is called degenerate.
Definition 8 highlights the fact that the notion of support
samples and of the compression set are not necessarily the
same. It follows then directly that support samples, as identi-
fied by Definition 6, form a strict subset of any compression
set in C; for a deeper discussion on degeneracy in scenario-
based contexts, we refer the reader to [39], [40].
C. Main results
We first show that a single-valued mapping Φ: ΘM → Ω
from the set of M -multisamples to the set of NE of the game
G indeed exists, and we can construct it in a decentralized
way without imposing (standard) strong requirements on the
monotonicity of the game.
Proposition 9. Under Assumptions 2 and 3, there exists a
single-valued decentralized mapping Φ: ΘM → Ω.
This construction, and hence the proof of Proposition 9 is
provided in Section III.
1) A posteriori certificate: We provide an a posteriori
quantification of an upper bound for V (x∗). This is summa-
rized in the following theorem.
Theorem 10. Consider Assumptions 2 and 3. Fix β ∈ (0, 1)
and let ε : {0, . . . ,M} → [0, 1] be a function satisfying
ε(M) = 1,
M−1∑
k=0
(
M
k
)
(1− ε(k))M−k = β. (5)
Let x∗ = Φ(θ1, . . . , θM ), where {θ1, . . . , θM} is a random
i.i.d. sample from Θ. We then have that
PM{(θ1, . . . , θM ) ∈ ΘM : V (x∗) ≤ ε(d∗)} ≥ 1− β, (6)
4where d∗ ≤M is the cardinality of any given compression set
of {θ1, . . . , θM}.
Theorem 10 shows that with confidence at least 1 − β the
probability that the NE x∗ ∈ Ω, computed on the basis of
the randomly extracted samples (θ1, . . . , θM ) ∈ ΘM , does not
remain an equilibrium of the game G+ when an additional
sample θ ∈ Θ is considered, is at most ε(d∗). Note that
(6) captures the generalization properties of x∗, where 1− β
accounts for the “probably” and ε(d∗) for the “approximately
correct” term used within a PAC learning framework.
The structure of ε(·) is determined in accordance to [35] and
depends on the observed compression cardinality d∗, which
in turn depends on the random multiextraction {θ1, . . . , θM}
thus giving rise to the a posteriori nature of the result. As
a result, the level of conservatism of the obtained certificate
depends on d∗; the smaller the cardinality of the computed
compression set, the tighter the bound (see Section V for a
detailed elaboration on the computation of d∗). The proof of
Theorem 10 is provided in Section IV-A.
In the case of a non-degenerate game (see Definition 8), the
bound could be significantly improved by means of the wait-
and-judge analysis of [39]: specifically, we can replace the
expression for ε(·) in (5) with the tighter bound of Theorem
1 in [39]. However, it should be noted that non-degeneracy
is a condition in general difficult to verify even in convex
optimization settings; moreover, here we only assume that
for any θ ∈ Θ, g(·, θ) is weakly convex, making the non-
degeneracy assumption quite restrictive.
2) A priori certificate: We now provide an a priori quan-
tification of an upper-bound of V (x∗). This is summarized in
the following theorem.
Theorem 11. Consider Assumptions 2 and 3. Fix β ∈ (0, 1)
and consider ε : {0, . . . ,M} → [0, 1] be a function satisfying
(5). Let x∗ = Φ(θ1, . . . , θM ), where (θ1, . . . , θM ) ∈ ΘM is
an i.i.d. multisample. We then have that
PM{(θ1, . . . , θM ) ∈ ΘM : V (x∗) ≤ ε((n+ 1)N)} ≥ 1− β.
(7)
The proof of Theorem 11 is provided in Section IV-B.
Although similar in form to Theorem 10, the bound on
V (x∗) provided by Theorem 11 additionally relies on the
developments in [36], [40]: these results are independent of the
given multisample and linked instead to the problem structure.
In this way, ε(·) is evaluated on the deterministic quantity
(n+1)N , expressing the dimension nN of the agents’ decision
space — plus N additional variables, due to the epigraphic
reformulation introduced in the proof of Theorem 11 — which
is known a priori. If we further assume that for all i ∈ N ,
for every fixed x−i ∈ X−i and θ ∈ Θ, both fi(·, x−i) and
g(·, x−i, θ) are convex, we would only need one epigraphic
variable, hence the argument of ε(·) could be replaced by
nN + 1 (see proof of Theorem 11).
As for Theorem 10, if we strengthen the assumptions of
Theorem 11 by imposing a non-degeneracy condition (see
Definition 8), (5) could be directly replaced by the tighter
expression in [39]. We wish to emphasize that it may still
be preferable to calculate the cardinality d∗ in an a posteriori
fashion, as in certain problems the latter might be significantly
lower compared to (n+ 1)N , hence the computed certificate
would be less conservative. This is also the case in the electric
vehicle charging control problem of Section VI.
The following corollary follows as a direct byproduct of the
proofs of our main results (see Section IV).
Corollary 12. Let x∗ = Φ(θ1, . . . , θM ) and consider
Vc(x
∗) = P{θ ∈ Θ: g(x∗, θ) > maxm∈{1,...,M} g(x∗, θm)}.
The following hold:
1) Under the assumptions of Theorem 10, (6) holds with
Vc(x
∗) in place of V (x∗).
2) Under the assumptions of Theorem 11, (7) holds with
Vc(x
∗) in place of V (x∗).
Corollary 12 shows that, with given confidence,
the probability that g(x∗, θ) — and hence also each
agent’s objective function — deteriorates with respect to
maxm∈{1,...,M} g(x∗, θm) when a new realization of the
uncertainty is encountered can be bounded both in an a
posteriori and an a priori fashion as in Theorem 10 and
Theorem 11, respectively. These statements are established
within the proofs of Theorems 10 and 11 (see (22)).
III. DECENTRALIZED NE COMPUTATION
In this section we show how to construct Φ, necessary
ingredient in the proof of Proposition 9. In particular, we show
that the image of Φ corresponds to the limit of a decentralized
algorithm that returns a NE of the game G. To achieve this, we
characterise the NE of G as solutions to a variational inequality
(VI). We then exploit existing results in this context that allow
us to obtain sufficient conditions for the existence of equilibria,
and set the foundations for the design of a decentralized NE
computation mechanism [5].
A. VI analysis
At the core of the use of the VI framework to analyze non-
cooperative games is the correspondence between the so called
VI problem, which for a given domain D takes the form
find z∗ ∈ D (8a)
subject to (z − z∗)ᵀF (z∗) ≥ 0, ∀z ∈ D, (8b)
and the first-order optimality conditions corresponding to a NE
(see Definition 1) [41, §1.4.2]. This model naturally hinges
on the differentiability of the problem at hand; however, it
can be directly observed that, due to the max operator in
(1), agents’ objective functions defining G are in general non-
differentiable.
With this in mind, we define the augmented game Ĝ between
N + 1 agents [37]. In Ĝ each player i ∈ N , given x−i and
y = (ym)
M
m=1, computes
xi ∈ arg min
νi∈Xi
fi(νi, x−i) +
M∑
m=1
ymg(νi, x−i, θm)︸ ︷︷ ︸
gˆ(νi,x−i,y)
, (9)
5where gˆ(x, y) follows from the equivalence
max
m∈{1,...,M}
g(x, θm) = max
y∈∆
M∑
m=1
ymg(x, θm), (10)
holding for any x as ∆ =
{
y ∈ RM : y ≥ 0,∑Mm=1 ym = 1}
is the simplex in RM [42, Lemma 6.2.1]. The additional agent
(could be thought of as a coordinating authority), given x, will
act instead as a maximizing player for the uncertain component
of Ji, i ∈ N , i.e.,
y ∈ arg max
ν∈∆
gˆ(x, ν). (11)
Note that, for any M -multisample (θ1, . . . , θM ) ∈ ΘM ,
Assumption 2 entails that Ĝ involves a differentiable objective
functions for all agents. Therefore, we can characterize the NE
of Ĝ as solutions of an appropriate VI. To this end, we define
the mapping F (x, y) : X × ∆ → R(nN+M) as the pseudo-
gradient [41, §1.4.1]
F (x, y) =
[
(∇xifi(x) +∇xi gˆ(x, y))i∈N
− (∇ym gˆ(x, y))Mm=1
]
. (12)
Letting z = (x, y) and D = X × ∆ we observe that
(8b) represents the concatenation of the first-order optimality
conditions for the N +1 individual problems described by (9)
and (11). In the following, we refer to the problem described
by (8) with an operator as in (12) as VI(F,X ×∆).
It turns out that there is a link between the equilibria of
G and those of Ĝ — described by the VI(F,X ×∆) — and
that Ω is always nonempty, as established by the following
proposition.
Proposition 13. Under Assumption 2, there always exists a
solution of VI(F,X × ∆). Denote such a solution by z∗ =
(x∗, y∗). We then have that x∗ is a NE of G.
Proof. The existence of a solution for the VI(F,X × ∆) is
guaranteed by [41, Cor. 2.2.5] under Assumption 2 and the
compactness of ∆. Denote such a solution by z∗. A link
between the solutions of the VI and those of the augmented
game is established by [41, Prop. 1.4.2]: z∗ = (x∗, y∗) is a
solution of Ĝ if and only if it solves VI(F,X ×∆). The link
with the original game G is provided by [37, Thm. 1]: for any
NE (x∗, y∗) of the game Ĝ, x∗ is a NE of G, which concludes
the proof.
B. Monotonicity of the augmented VI operator
The development of algorithms for the solution of VI prob-
lems relies upon the monotonicity of the mapping F in (8),
which plays a role analogous to convexity in optimization [5].
Definition 14 (Monotonicity). A mapping F : D → RnN+M ,
with D ⊆ RnN+M closed and convex, is
• monotone on D if (u − v)ᵀ(F (u) − F (v)) ≥ 0 for all
u, v ∈ D,
• strongly monotone on D if there exists c > 0 such that
(u− v)ᵀ(F (u)− F (v)) ≥ c‖u− v‖2 for all u, v ∈ D.
The following result is instrumental in our analysis:
Lemma 15. Consider Assumptions 2 and 3. We then have that
F (x, y) in (12) is monotone on X ×∆.
Proof. By Assumption 3, F (x, y) is continuously differ-
entiable on its domain. Let F x and F y denote the
first nM and the last M rows of F , respectively, i.e.,
F x(x, y) = (∇xifi(x) +∇xig(x, y))i∈N , and F y(x, y) =
(∇ymg(x, y))Mm=1. By definition of the Jacobian we have
JF (x, y) =
[
JxF
x(x, y) JyF
x(x, y)
−JxF y(x, y) −JyF y(x, y)
]
(13)
where JxF x(x, y) = (∇2xixjfi(x))i,j∈N + ∇2xxgˆ(x, y),
JyF
x = (JxF
y(x, y))ᵀ = (∇2xiy(fi(x) + gˆ(x, y)))i∈N ,
and JyF y(x, y) = 0. Notice that (∇2xixjfi(x))i,j∈N is a
matrix with ∇2xixjfi(x) being its (i, j)-th entry. Due to the
differentiability conditions of Assumption 3, the monotonicity
requirements of Assumption 2 are equivalent (see p. 90 in
[37]) to the existence of constants χf , χg ∈ R such that, for
all (x, y) ∈ X ×∆, and for all ν ∈ RnN ,
ν
ᵀ
(∇2xixjfi(x))i,j∈N ν ≥ χf‖ν‖2, (14)
ν
ᵀ∇2xxgˆ(x, y)ν ≥ χg‖ν‖2, (15)
with χf + χg ≥ 0 for the sum of fi and g to be convex, as
required by Assumption 2. Summing the above inequalities
yields
ν
ᵀ
(
(∇2xixjfi(x))i,j∈N +∇2xxgˆ(x, y)
)
ν
= ν
ᵀ
JxF
x(x, y)ν ≥ (χf + χg)‖ν‖2, ∀ν ∈ RnN , (16)
which, since χf + χg ≥ 0, corresponds to JxF x(x, y)  0,
and due to the fact that JyF y(x, y) = 0 in (13), implies that
νᵀJF (x, y)ν ≥ 0 for all ν ∈ RnN+M . The statement then
follows directly from [41, Prop. 2.3.2], thus concluding the
proof.
A direct consequence of the monotonicity of F is that by [5,
Thm. 41], VI(F,X×∆) may admit multiple solutions: this fact
together with [41, Prop. 1.4.2] — stating the correspondence
between the solutions of the VI(F,X ×∆) and the NE of Ĝ
— implies that the game Ĝ may admit multiple NE.
C. Decentralized algorithm for monotone VI and equilibrium
selection
There are two main challenges on constructing a single-
valued, decentralized mapping Φ that returns a NE for G, as
required by Proposition 9: first, due to the possible presence
of multiple equilibria, a tie-break rule needs to be put in
place to single a particular NE out of the possibly many
ones, thus ensuring that Φ is single-valued. Second, standard
decentralized algorithms for VI are not guaranteed to converge
on monotone problems; a tighter condition, namely, strong
monotonicity is required on the VI mapping F .
To address the first challenge, it should be noted that even
if only one NE is returned by some algorithm (not necessarily
decentralized), the mapping Φ is not necessarily single-valued,
as using different initial conditions in the underlying algorithm
a different NE may be returned. To alleviate this and construct
6a single-valued mapping, we employ the results of [5]. In
particular, [5, Algorithm 4] allows us to select the minimum
Euclidean norm NE; the choice of the Euclidean norm is
not restrictive, and a wide range of strictly convex objective
function could have been used as a selector instead (see [5,
Thm. 21]). Therefore, we formulate the following optimization
program.
z∗ = arg min
z∗∈X×∆
1
2
‖z∗‖2 (17a)
subject to (z − z∗)ᵀF (z∗) ≥ 0, ∀z ∈ D, (17b)
where F is monotone and ‖ · ‖ denotes the Euclidean norm.
To address the second challenge and characterize Φ by
means of a decentralized methodology, we can employ the
results in [5], [43]. In particular, it is shown that proximal
algorithms can be used to retrieve a solution of a monotone
VI by solving a particular sequence of strongly monotone
problems, derived by regularizing the original problem. There-
fore, we consider the regularized game Ĝτ,z¯ , where τ ∈ R+
and z¯ = (x¯, y¯) are the designated step size and centre of
regularization, respectively. Then, given the tuple (x−i, y, x¯i),
each player i ∈ N solves the following problem
xi = arg min
νi∈Xi
fi(νi, x−i) + gˆ(νi, x−i, y)
+
η
2
‖(νi, x−i, y)‖2 + τ
2
‖νi − x¯i‖2, (18)
while the additional agent (player N + 1), given (x, y¯), solves
y = arg max
ν∈∆
gˆ(x, ν)− η
2
‖(x, ν)‖2 − τ
2
‖ν − y¯‖2, (19)
with η ∈ R+. Note that Assumption 2 still holds for (18)–
(19). By taking the pseudo-gradient of the above as in (12),
we have from [41, Prop. 1.4.2] that z∗ = (x∗, y∗) is a NE
of Ĝτ,z¯ if and only if it satisfies the VI corresponding to the
regularized game, i.e.,
(z−z∗)ᵀ(F (z∗)+ηz∗+τ(z∗−z¯)) ≥ 0, ∀z, z¯ ∈ X×∆. (20)
The next lemma shows that the regularized game admits a
unique NE.
Lemma 16. Consider Assumptions 2 and 3. Let F be as
in (12), and fix η ≥ 0. We then have that, for any τ > 0
and z¯ ∈ X ×∆, the regularized game Ĝτ,z¯ defined by (18)–
(19) admits a unique NE.
Proof. To establish uniqueness of the NE it suffices to show
that F τ,z¯ is strongly monotone [5, Thm. 41]. Fix any u, v ∈
RnN+M . Let F τ,z¯(u) = F (u) + ηu + τ(u − z¯), and define
F τ,z¯(v) similarly. We have
(u− v)ᵀ(F τ,z¯(u)− F τ,z¯(v))
= (u− v)ᵀ(F (u)− F (v)) + (η + τ)‖u− v‖2
≥ τ‖u− v‖2, (21)
where the inequality follows from the fact that η ∈ R+, and
(u − v)ᵀ(F (u) − F (v)) ≥ 0 (see Definition 14) since F is
monotone due to Lemma 15. By Definition 14, (21) implies
that F τ,z¯ is strongly monotone, thus concluding the proof.
Algorithm 1 Decentralized NE seeking algorithm
Require: z¯(0) ∈ X ×∆, τ > 0, γinn > 0, γout > 0
1: k ← 0
2: repeat (outer loop)
3: l← 0
4: repeat (inner loop)
5: for i = 1, . . . , N do
6: x(l+1)i ← arg min
νi∈Xi
fi(νi, x
(l)
−i) + gˆ(νi, x
(l)
−i, y
(l))
+ η
(k)
2
‖(νi, x(l)−i, y(l))‖2 + τ2 ‖νi − x¯(k)i ‖2
7: end for
8: y(l+1)i ← arg max
ν∈∆
gˆ(x(l), ν)
− η(k)
2
‖(x(l), ν)‖2 − τ
2
‖ν − y¯(k)‖2
9: l← l + 1
10: until ‖z(l) − z(l−1)‖ ≤ γinn
11: z¯(k+1) ← z(l)
12: k ← k + 1
13: until ‖z¯(k) − z¯(k−1)‖ ≤ γout
Now let Sτ (·) denote the solution of the VI(F τ,·,X ×∆).
Building on Lemma 16, we aim at determining a NE of
G by updating the centre of regularization of Ĝτ,· on the
basis of an iterative method in the form z¯(k+1) = Sτ (z¯(k)),
until convergence to the fixed point z∗ = Sτ (z∗). The
latter corresponds to the (unique under Lemma 16) NE of
Ĝτ,z∗ , which satisfies (17). Algorithm 1 provides the means to
establish such a connection; this is formalised in the following
proposition.
Proposition 17 (Thm. 21 [5]). Consider Assumptions 2 and 3.
Consider also the game G defined by (9)–(11) and the regular-
ized augmented game Ĝτ,· defined by (18)–(19). Let {η(k)}∞k=0
be any sequence satisfying η(k) > 0 for all k,
∑∞
k=0 η
(k) =∞,
and limk→∞ η(k) = 0. Consider a small enough τ¯ > 0 and let
{z¯(k)}∞k=0 denote the sequence generated by Algorithm 1. For
any τ ≥ τ¯ , there exists γinn, γout > 0 such that {z¯(k)}∞k=0
is bounded, and z∗ = (x∗, y∗) solution of (17) such that
‖z¯(k) − z∗‖ → 0 for k →∞. Moreover, x∗ ∈ Ω.
Convergence of Algorithm 1 is guaranteed by [5, Thm. 21].
In particular, it asymptotically converges to a solution of (17),
while by Proposition 13, (17b) it is equivalent to the game Ĝ,
whose solution set is nonempty and is also contained in Ω due
to the second part of Proposition 13. Note that [5, Thm. 21]
an explicit expression for τ¯ is provided so that steps 3–11 of
Algorithm 1 constitute a block contraction [44].
Proof of Proposition 9: Algorithm 1, and its analysis
in Proposition 17, serves as an implicit construction of a
decentralized, single-valued mapping Φ: ΘM → Ω, thus
establishing Proposition 9. 
Note that the mapping Φ induced by Algorithm 1 formally
depends on the initial condition; we do not make this depen-
dency explicit since the same minimum norm NE is returned
irrespective of the initial condition. We point out however that
for the theoretical developments in the proof of Theorem 11
this dependence becomes relevant. Hence, for the analysis of
Section IV-B we will introduce the notation Φx0 to highlight
7the dependency of Φ on the initial condition x0 = x¯(0) ∈ X .
Notice that y¯(0) which also appears in the initial condition
z¯(0) of Algorithm 1 depends on the M -multisample which is
already an argument of Φ, hence we only include x0 as a
subscript.
IV. PROOFS OF a posteriori AND a priori CERTIFICATES
A. Proof of Theorem 10
Fix any M ∈ N. Consider (θ1, . . . , θM ) ∈ ΘM , and let
d∗ ≤ M be the cardinality of any given compression set of
{θ1, . . . , θM} (recall that it depends on the observation of the
M -multisample). Let x∗ = Φ(θ1, . . . , θM ) ∈ Ω, and γ∗ =
maxm∈{1,...,M} g(x∗, θm). For any θ ∈ Θ, consider the set
Hθ = {(x∗, γ∗) : g(x∗, θ) ≤ γ∗}.
Fix β ∈ (0, 1) and consider ε(·) defined as in (5). Under
Assumptions 2 and 3, Φ is single-valued by Proposition 9. By
[35, Thm. 1] we then have that
PM
{
(θ1, . . . , θM ) ∈ ΘM :
P{θ ∈ Θ: (x∗, γ∗) /∈ Hθ} ≤ ε(d∗)
} ≥ 1− β, (22)
if the following consistency condition holds for Hθ (see [33]
for a definition)
(x∗, γ∗) ∈ Hθm , ∀m ∈ {1, . . . ,M}. (23)
To show this, notice that for each i ∈ N , by the NE
definition (Definition 1), (x∗i , γ
∗) will belong to the set of
minimizers of the following epigraphic reformulation of the
optimization program involved in G, i.e.,
(x∗i , γ
∗) ∈ arg min
xi∈Xi,γ∈R
fi(xi, x
∗
−i) + γ (24a)
subject to g(xi, x
∗
−i, θm) ≤ γ, ∀m ∈ {1, · · · ,M}. (24b)
By (24b) it follows then that (23) is satisfied, thus establishing
(22). Note that for the result of [35] to be invoked, (24) is
not required to be a convex optimization program, hence the
fact that for each i ∈ N , for any θ ∈ Θ, only fi(·, x∗−i) +
g(·, x∗−i, θ) is assumed to be convex by Assumptions 2, and
not fi(·, x∗−i) and g(·, x∗−i, θ) individually, is sufficient.
By the definition of γ∗ and Hθ, (22) implies that
with confidence at least 1 − β, P{θ ∈ Θ: g(x∗, θ) >
maxm∈{1,...,M} g(x∗, θm)} ≤ ε(d∗), thus establishing the first
part of Corollary 12.
We now proceed to demonstrate the claim in (6). Recall
that, by (12), (17) and Proposition 13, we can obtain x∗ ∈ Ω
as solution of the following optimization program (note the
slight abuse of notation as by (x∗, y∗) we denote both the
optimizer and the corresponding decision vector).
min
(x∗,y∗)∈X×∆
1
2
‖(x∗, y∗)‖2 (25a)
subject to∑
i∈N
(xi − x∗i )ᵀ∇xi(fi(x∗) + gˆ(x∗, y∗))
−
M∑
m=1
(ym − y∗m)∇ym gˆ(x∗, y∗) ≥ 0, ∀x ∈ X , y ∈ ∆, (25b)
where (x∗, y∗) is a NE of Ĝ. By definition of gˆ in (9), and
recalling ∇ym(
∑M
m=1 y
∗
mg(x
∗, θm)) = g(x∗, θm), (25b) can
be equivalently written as
∑
i∈N
(xi − x∗i )ᵀ∇xi(fi(x∗) +
M∑
m=1
y∗mg(x
∗, θm))
+
M∑
m=1
y∗mg(x
∗, θm)−
M∑
m=1
ymg(x
∗, θm) ≥ 0,
∀x ∈ X , y ∈ ∆. (26)
As (26) holds for all y ∈ ∆, we have that (25b) is equivalent
to the following inequality being satisfied for all x ∈ X ,
∑
i∈N
(xi − x∗i )ᵀ∇xi(fi(x∗) +
M∑
m=1
y∗mg(x
∗, θm))
+
M∑
m=1
y∗mg(x
∗, θm)−max
y∈∆
M∑
m=1
ymg(x
∗, θm)
=
∑
i∈N
(xi − x∗i )ᵀ∇xi(fi(x∗) +
M∑
m=1
y∗mg(x
∗, θm))
+
M∑
m=1
y∗mg(x
∗, θm)− max
m∈{1,...,M}
g(x∗, θm) ≥ 0.
(27)
For a given θ ∈ Θ, recall from Section II-C the definition of
the game G+ associated with the samples {θ1, . . . , θM}∪{θ},
and the associated set of NE Ω+. Moreover, let Ĝ+ denote the
associated augmented game. Analogously to (27), any solution
(x+, y+) ∈ X ×∆+, where ∆+ is the simplex in RM+1, of
the augmented game Ĝ+ will satisfy the following VI.
∑
i∈N
(xi − x+i )ᵀ∇xi
(
fi(x
+) +
M∑
m=1
y+mg(x
+, θm)
)
+
∑
i∈N
(xi − x+i )ᵀ∇xi
(
y+M+1g(x
+, θ)
)
+
M∑
m=1
y+mg(x
+, θm) + y
+
M+1g(x
+, θ)
−max{ max
m∈{1,...,M}
g(x+, θm), g(x
+, θ)
} ≥ 0. (28)
Note the analogy between (28) and (27), with the additional
terms corresponding to the new sample θ (yM+1 is the
additional decision variable corresponding to the new sample).
We are interested in quantifying the probability of x∗ ∈ Ω+.
To this end, notice that if g(x∗, θ) ≤ γ∗, then x+ = x∗ and
y+ = (y∗ᵀ, 0)ᵀ constitute a feasible pair for (28). This is due
to the fact that under this choice y+M+1 = 0 and hence
max
{
max
m∈{1,...,M}
g(x∗, θm), g(x∗, θ)
}
= max
{
γ∗, g(x∗, θ)
}
= γ∗ = max
m∈{1,...,M}
g(x∗, θm),
thus (28) reduces to (27). Applying Proposition 13 to G+ and
Ĝ+, we have that if (x+, y+) satisfies (28) (i.e., it is a NE of
8the augmented game Ĝ+) then x+ ∈ Ω+. Therefore, x∗ ∈ Ω+
whenever g(x∗, θ) ≤ γ∗, or in other words
P{θ ∈ Θ: (x∗, γ∗) ∈ Hθ} = P{θ ∈ Θ: g(x∗, θ) ≤ γ∗}
≤ P{θ ∈ Θ: x∗ ∈ Ω+}, (29)
By (22) and (29), (6) follows, thus concluding the proof. 
B. Proof of Theorem 11
Let C0 ⊆ {θ1, . . . , θM} be a minimal cardinality compres-
sion set for the minimum norm NE x∗ returned by Algorithm
1. Following the discussion at the end of Section III we denote
the mapping induced by Algorithm 1 as Φx0 , where we make
explicit the dependence on the initial condition x0 ∈ X . By
the definition of a compression set (see Definition 7), we then
have that x∗ = Φx0(θ1, . . . , θM ) = Φx0(C0), for all x0 ∈ X .
Consider now the following optimization program.
({x∗i , γ∗i }i∈N ) = arg min
{xi∈Xi,γi∈R}i∈N
∑
i∈N
(
γi + τ‖xi − x∗i ‖2
)
(30a)
subject to fi(xi, x
∗
−i) + g(xi, x
∗
−i, θm) ≤ γi,
∀i ∈ N , ∀m ∈ {1, · · · ,M}, (30b)
where in (30a) we have equality and not inclusion since
the set of minimizers is a singleton due to strict convexity
of the objective function. Note that (30) is separable across
i ∈ N , with each of these subproblems corresponding to an
epigraphic reformulation of the fixed point characterization
of the regularized problem (18) for η = 0 (this is the value
of η(k) when the proposed algorithm has converged to x∗)
and x¯i = x∗i , for all i ∈ N . The latter is identical to Φx0
with x0 = x∗. Therefore, for the NE satisfying (30) we have
x∗ = Φx∗(θ1, . . . , θM ). Notice that (30) is not an optimization
program to be solved with respect to agents’ strategies, but
a fixed point characterization of x∗. Also note that we have
introduced one epigraphic variable per agent i ∈ N ; this is
since we will invoke in the sequel the fact that (30) is convex
due to Assumption 2 . However, if we further assume that
for all i ∈ N , for every fixed x−i ∈ X−i and θ ∈ Θ, the
individual functions fi(·, x−i) and g(·, x−i, θ) are convex, we
would only need one epigraphic variable, as we could perform
an epigraphic reformulation only for g (this would give rise
to the constraint in (24b)), which is common to all agents.
Let C denote the minimal cardinality compression set for x∗
in (30). We claim that C0 ⊆ C. To show this, assume for the
sake of contradiction that there exists k ∈ {1, . . . ,M} such
that θk ∈ C0 but θk /∈ C. Consider the set {θ1, . . . , θM} \
{θk} ⊇ C, and notice that this has to be a compression set for
x∗ in (30) as it is a superset of C. By Definition 7, this implies
that x∗ = Φx∗({θ1, . . . , θM}\{θk}) (recall that the solution of
(30) is given by x∗ = Φx∗(θ1, . . . , θM )). However, θk ∈ C0,
hence it belongs to a minimal compression set (see Definition
6) for x∗, i.e., if removed then the solution alters (this is due
to the fact that C0 is of minimal cardinality). Hence, x∗ 6=
Φx∗({θ1, . . . , θM} \ {θk}), thus establishing a contradiction,
showing that C0 ⊆ C (hence |C0| ≤ |C|).
Algorithm 2 Greedy computation of compression set
Require: C = {θ1, . . . , θM}, x∗ ∈ Ω;
1: for all m ∈ {1, . . . ,M} do
2: x◦ ← Φ(C \ θm);
3: if x◦ = x∗ then
4: C ← C \ θm;
5: end if
6: end for
By Assumptions 2, (30) is a convex scenario program, and
admits a unique solution due to the fact that the objective func-
tion in (30a) is strictly convex. Moreover, it has a non-empty
feasibility region in view of Proposition 13. Therefore, by [36],
[40], we have that any minimal cardinality compression set C
has cardinality upper-bounded by (n+1)N , i.e., the number of
decision variables in (30). Therefore, |C0| ≤ |C| ≤ (n+ 1)N .
As a result, the minimal compression set cardinality |C0| can
be upper-bounded by the a priori known quantity (n+1)N . As
Theorem 10 holds for any compression cardinality d∗ ≥ |C0|,
we can apply it with d∗ = (n + 1)N . Therefore the result
of Theorem 11 as well as of the second part of Corollary 12
directly follow, thus concluding the proof. 
V. COMPUTATION OF THE COMPRESSION SET
CARDINALITY
The result of Theorem 10 relies on the computation of the
compression cardinality d∗, which by Definition 7 is bounded
by M . An a posteriori estimate of the compression cardinal-
ity can be obtained through different methodologies, whose
design may be tuned on the specific case. It follows from (6)
that the closer the estimate to the minimal cardinality of the
compression sets in C, the less conservative the probabilistic
guarantees on the robustness performance of the solution. In
[35, §II] a greedy procedure is outlined to estimate (an upper
bound to) the minimal compression cardinality. According to
this process, a compression set C is constructed progressively
by removing samples one by one (step 2). If their removal
leaves the solution unaltered (step 3), then they are removed
from C; this is then repeated till no further sample can be re-
moved without changing x∗. For completeness, we summarize
this procedure in Algorithm 2. However, there are two major
drawbacks: First, the computational cost is generally high, as
Φ(·) should be evaluated at least M times, and in turn requires
to run the iterative procedure of Algorithm 1 that converges to
x∗ only asymptotically; Second, in practice, limited numerical
accuracy makes the evaluation of the condition at Step 3 of
Algorithm 2 a difficult task.
To alleviate these, we provide in this section a computa-
tionally efficient way to determine a compression set, and
hence the compression cardinality used in Theorem 10, as a
direct byproduct of the algorithm developed to construct the
mapping Φ. To achieve this, we impose certain NE uniqueness
requirements. However, it should be noted that for the wide
class of aggregative games, the additional structure required in
the proposition below implies only uniqueness of an aggregate
strategy, and multiple equilibria may exist. This is summarized
in the following proposition.
9Proposition 18. Consider Assumptions 2 and 3. Further
assume that for all M ∈ N, either
1) G admits a unique NE;
2) or, g depends on the aggregate strategy1 σ(x) : x 7→∑
i∈N xi, and G admits a unique NE aggregate σ(x).
The set Y∗ , {m ∈ {1, . . . ,M} : y∗m > 0} corresponds to
the indices of a compression set, i.e., x∗ = Φ(θ1, . . . , θM ) =
Φ({θm}m∈Y∗).
Proof. Part 1: Uniqueness of NE. Fix any (θ1, . . . , θM ) ∈
ΘM and notice that it forms a (trivial) compression set for x∗.
Let (x∗, y∗) be a solution of the augmented game Ĝ, where
y∗ = (y∗m)
M
m=1. To prove that x
∗ = Φ({θm}m∈Y∗) it suffices
to show that the solution returned by Φ remains unaltered after
removing all samples from {θ1, . . . , θM} whose associated
component of y∗ is zero.
To this end, suppose that at least one such sample exists:
without loss of generality, assume y∗M = 0 (i.e., that sample
has index M ). We will first show that {θ1, . . . , θM−1} is
a compression set, i.e., x∗ = Φ(θ1, . . . , θM−1). Let G− =
〈N , (Xi)i∈N , (Ji)i∈N , {θj}M−1j=1 〉 be the game associated with
the samples {θ1, . . . , θM−1}. Moreover, let Ĝ− denote the
associated augmented game, and ∆− the simplex in RM−1.
Since (x∗, y∗) is an NE of Ĝ, it will satisfy the VI in (27).
At the same time, every solution (x−, y−) ∈ X ×∆− of the
augmented game Ĝ− satisfies the following VI:∑
i∈N
(xi − x−i )ᵀ∇xi
(
fi(x
−) +
M−1∑
m=1
y−mg(x
−, θm)
)
+
M−1∑
m=1
y−mg(x
−, θm)− max
m∈{1,...,M−1}
g(x−, θm) ≥ 0. (31)
Set x− = x∗ and y− = (y∗m)
M−1
m=1 . Under this choice
(x−, y−) satisfies (31), as maxm∈{1,...,M−1} g(x∗, θm) ≤
maxm∈{1,...,M} g(x∗, θm). Equivalently, (x∗, (y∗m)
M−1
m=1 ) is an
NE for Ĝ−, and by applying Proposition 13 to G− and Ĝ− we
have that x∗ is an NE for G−. However, due to the uniqueness
assumption, x∗ has to be the only NE of G−, showing that
x∗ = Φ(θ1, . . . , θM−1).
Following the same procedure, removing one by one all
samples for which the associated elements of y∗ are zero,
shows that x∗ = Φ(θ1, . . . , θM ) = Φ({θm}m∈Y∗), thus
concluding the proof of the first part.
Part 2: Uniqueness of NE aggregate. The proof follows the
same arguments as in Part 1 with the following modifications.
The derivation until the discussion right after (31) remains
unaltered, showing that (x∗, (y∗m)
M−1
m=1 ) is a NE of Ĝ−. To
prove that x∗ = Φ(θ1, . . . , θM−1) it suffices to show that
(x∗, (y∗)M−1m=1 ) is the minimum norm NE. We thus assume
for the sake of contradiction that (xˆ, yˆ) ∈ X × ∆− is the
NE of Ĝ− that achieves the minimum norm, i.e., ‖(xˆ, yˆ)‖2 <
‖(x∗, (y∗)M−1m=1 )‖2. We distinguish two cases:
Case 1: g(σ(xˆ), θM ) ≤ maxm∈{1,...,M−1} g(σ(xˆ), θm).
Under the condition of this case observe that (xˆ, (yˆᵀ, 0)ᵀ)
1With a slight abuse of notation, in the second part of the proposition it is
to be understood that for all i ∈ N and for any given x−i, Assumptions 2–3
refer to the function fi(·, x−i) + g(σ(·, x−i), θ).
satisfies the VI in (27) for the game with M samples. How-
ever, as (x∗, y∗) is the minimum norm equilibrium for that
game, we have that ‖(x∗, y∗)‖2 ≤ ‖(xˆ, (yˆᵀ, 0)ᵀ)‖2. Overall,
recalling y∗M = 0, ‖(x∗, (y∗)M−1m=1 )‖2 = ‖(x∗, y∗)‖2 ≤
‖(xˆ, (yˆᵀ, 0)ᵀ)‖2 = ‖(xˆ, yˆ)‖2, thus establishing a contradiction.
We can then show that x∗ = Φ(θ1, . . . , θM ) = Φ({θm}m∈Y∗)
as in the last paragraph of Part 1.
Case 2: g(σ(xˆ), θM ) > maxm∈{1,...,M−1} g(σ(xˆ), θm). We
will show that, under our assumptions, this case cannot occur.
By the uniqueness assumption we have that σ(xˆ) = σ(x∗) for
any equilibrium xˆ 6= x∗ (the NE is not necessarily unique, but
all equilibria have the same aggregate). We then have
g(σ(x∗), θM ) = g(σ(xˆ), θM ) > max
m∈{1,...,M−1}
g(σ(xˆ), θm)
≥ g(σ(xˆ), θm) = g(σ(x∗), θm), (32)
for any m ∈ 1, . . . ,M − 1. Therefore
g(σ(x∗), θM ) > max
m∈{1,...,M−1}
g(σ(x∗), θm). (33)
Consider now the epigraphic reformulation of G in (24). By
direct computation of the KKT optimality conditions [42,
§6.2.1] corresponding to (24) and to (11), respectively, it can
be verified that the decision variable y ∈ ∆ introduced in
the augmented game of (9)–(11) is a shadow price for the
constraint (24b). By the complementary slackness condition it
holds
y∗m (g(σ(x
∗), θm)− γ∗) = 0, ∀m ∈ {1, . . . ,M}. (34)
By observing that yM = 0 implies g(σ(x∗), θM ) ≤ γ∗ we
obtain
max
m∈{1,...,M}
g(σ(x∗), θm) = max
m∈{1,...,M−1}
g(σ(x∗), θm).
(35)
From (35) it follows maxm∈{1,...,M−1} g(σ(x∗), θm) =
maxm∈{1,...,M} g(σ(x∗), θm) ≥ g(σ(x∗), θM ). This last state-
ment establishes a contradiction with (32), which concludes
the proof of the second part.
Based on the shadow price interpretation of y (see proof
of Proposition 18) notice that if g(x∗, θm) < γ∗ (inactive
constraint) then y∗m = 0. Note that samples with y
∗
m = 0 can
be removed without altering x∗ due to the imposed uniqueness
requirements; otherwise, the feasibility region of the VI in (31)
may enlarge, thus resulting in a different minimum norm NE.
Moreover, it should be noted that Proposition 18 does not
provide guarantees that a minimal cardinality compression set
is determined; this can be obtained by Algorithm 2 (see also
[35]). However, the important implication of Proposition 18 is
that the cardinality of a compression set is readily available
by inspecting y∗ and does not require an iterative procedure.
VI. CASE STUDY: ELECTRIC VEHICLE CHARGING
CONTROL
A. Problem set-up
We consider a stylized electric vehicle (EV) charging con-
trol problem, with EVs being selfish entities interested in
minimizing their own cost (e.g., belonging to different users),
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thus giving rise to a gaming formulation. Let {1, . . . , N}
index a finite population of EV vehicles/agents. We denote
by xi ∈ Rn the demand profile each EV seeks to determine
over n time slots, where for simplicity time slots are taken
to be of unit length (1 hour). Vehicles’ charging strategy is
in response to a pricing signal received from a coordinator,
which in turn depends on demand profiles of all agents. For
our study we consider price to be an affine function of the
aggregate strategy σ(x) : x 7→∑i∈N xi, but other choices are
also supported by our theoretical analysis. However, price is
subject to uncertainty, e.g., externalities acting on the energy
spot market, encoded by the random variable θ ∈ Θ.
Within this context, each vehicle i = 1, . . . , N aims at
minimizing
fi(xi, x−i) + max
m∈{1,...,M}
g(xi, x−i, θm) =
x
ᵀ
i (A0σ(x) + b0) +
1
N
max
m∈{1,...,M}
σ(x)
ᵀ
(Amσ(x) + bm),
(36)
where Am ∈ Rn×n, for m = 0, 1, . . . ,M , are diagonal
matrices, and bm ∈ Rn. In such a setting, historical price data
can be used to derive (e.g., through standard scenario gen-
eration techniques [29]) the set {θm}Mm=1 = {Am, bm}Mm=1
characterizing the uncertain price component. Moreover, we
assume the charging operations are subject to Xi , {xi ∈ Rn :
1ᵀxi ≥ Ei, 0 ≤ xij ≤ Pi, ∀j = 1, . . . , n}, where Ei, Pi ∈ R
respectively designate the desired final state of charge (SoC)
and the maximum power deliverable by the charger. The EV
charging game takes the form of an (aggregative) game in the
form of G, with the objective functions and constraint sets
defined above.
We analyse the results of several randomly generated cases,
differing in the parameters characterizing the EV constraints
Xi, selected from a uniform random distribution: specifically,
Pi ∈ [6, 15] kW, and Ei is chosen to be feasible in the
specified time interval (∼0–35 kWh per 12 h interval). The
pairs {Am, bm}Mm=1 are i.i.d. extracted from a lognormal
distribution for the diagonal entries of Am, and a positive-
valued uniform distribution for the vectors bm. The nominal
electricity price, i.e., the diagonal entries {at}nt=1 of the matrix
A0, have been derived by rescaling a winter weekday demand
profile in the UK [45], whereas b0 = 0.
It should be noted that even though this example fits in
the class of aggregative games, it does not necessarily meet
the uniqueness requirement of the second part of Proposition
18. However, we have empirically observed that the main
conclusion of the proposition still holds, namely, the minimum
norm solution returned by Algorithm 1 remains unaltered
when the algorithm is fed only with the samples with indices
in Y∗. Informally, this happens due to the fact that for any
feasible problem instance 1ᵀxi ≥ Ei will always be binding
at the optimum, and as result 1ᵀσ(x) will be constant for
any NE x (see also transparent plane in Figure 3); a detailed
investigation of this issue is topic of current research.
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Fig. 1. Convergence of EV agents’ and coordinator’s costs (outer loop), for
N = 20, n = 24, M = 500: a dominant linear convergence rate can
be observed. Ji denotes the cost of each player i = 1, . . . , N , and the
coordinator of the augmented game Ĝ, defined by the objective functions
in (9) and (11), respectively.
Fig. 2. Convergence of the solution vector to the NE (outer loop) for N = 20,
n = 24, M = 500: a dominant linear convergence rate can be observed.
B. Simulation results
The NE charging schedules have been obtained by imple-
menting Algorithm 1 with γinn = 10−14, γout = 10−5 and τ ∈
[4, 6]. At each iteration of the proposed algorithm a quadratic
optimization needs to be solved; this was performed on a dual-
core 7th gen. Intel processor using MATLAB. Figures 1–2
show the convergence of Algorithm 1 in the computation of
the NE for N = 20 EVs, n = 24 and M = 500. A dominant
linear convergence rate can be observed, and less than 4000
outer loop iterations were needed to meet the desired exit
accuracy γout. The inner loop enjoys similar convergence rate
(not shown for space reasons), and less than 30 iterations (15
in average) are needed to achieve an error smaller than γinn.
To validate the a posteriori result of Theorem 10, Table I
shows the average robustness performance of several solutions
(with N = 20, n = 24) obtained from different sets of M =
500 samples, grouped according to the a posteriori observed
compression cardinality d∗. The violation rate V (x∗) of each
solution is empirically computed using 106 newly extracted
samples (according to the same aforementioned distributions)
and counting the fraction of them that resulting in a change
of the computed NE. Consistently with [35], we note that
the observed value of d∗ is indicative of the confidence level
on the equilibrium robustness. The experimental results are
compared with the theoretical bound provided by Theorem 10.
In this case, the conservatism of the latter is due to the
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TABLE I
EMPIRICAL VALIDATION OF THE a posteriori RESULT OF THEOREM 10.
d∗ [ - ] 4 6 7 9
Empirical rate [%] 0.98 1.09 1.26 1.33
Theorem 10 bound [%] 8.06 9.76 10.55 12.06
relatively small number of samples (500) employed for the
computation of the NE, and the fact that we did not employ the
tighter confidence bound of [39], in view not imposing a non-
degeneracy assumption whose validity cannot be verified. We
observe that a much tighter bound on the violation probability
(∼2–3%) can be achieved in the same case by increasing the
size of the sample to M = 2000; this naturally comes at
the price of an increase of the computational requirements,
which is nonetheless (practically) independent of the number
of agents, due to the decentralized scheme employed.
A visual representation of the concept of support constraint
is given in Fig. 3. The plot depicts the curves expressing
the uncertain cost term Ng(x∗, θm) associated to a subset
m ∈ {53, 72, 282, 566} of the M = 1000 samples used for the
derivation of the NE x∗. Values are plotted as a function of the
aggregate demand (σ(x)|t=1, σ(x)|t=2) on an interval around
σ(x∗). In this case the compression cardinality is d∗ = 2, with
{θ53, θ282} supporting the solution together with the constraint
on the target SoC which is binding in this case. This is shown
by the plane in transparent blue, representing all possible
values of the aggregate strategies satisfying
∑
i∈N Ei over
the considered time interval. Note that in this instance the
constraints on the power rate Pi are not active, and omitted
from the plot for clarity.
We now investigate numerically the validity of the a priori
result of Theorem 11. Fig. 4 shows the average compression
set cardinality d∗ observed over 50 trials, corresponding to
different randomly generated cases corresponding to different
values of n and M . In all cases, d∗ is bounded by (n+1)N as
suggested by Theorem 11. In fact, the empirically calculated
cardinality d∗ is significantly lower, suggesting that in this
case study an a posteriori quantification is less conservative.
Moreover, in all our numerical investigations we noticed that
d∗ ≤ n, i.e., the empirical compression set cardinality is
independent of the number of agents and is bounded by the
individual number of decision variables. We conjecture that for
the aggregative EV charging game considered here, involving
affine price functions, the so called support rank (see [46]
for a definition) offers a tighter bound on the compression set
cardinality compared to the total number of decision variables.
Detailed investigation of this observation is outside the scope
of the paper and is left for future work.
VII. CONCLUDING REMARKS
We considered the problem of NE computation in multi-
agent games in the presence of uncertainty. We constructed a
decentralized NE computation methodology and accompanied
the resulting solution with a priori and a posteriori certificates
regarding the probability that the NE equilibrium remains
unchanged when a new uncertainty realization is encountered.
Such results could be thought of as a probabilistic sensitivity
Fig. 3. Case with N = 20, n = 2: Uncertain cost component Ng(x∗, θm)
for a subset m ∈ {53, 72, 282, 566} of the M = 1000 samples used for the
derivation of the NE x∗. Curves are plotted as a function of the aggregate
demand (σ(x)|t=1, σ(x)|t=2) on an interval around σ(x∗), plotted in red.
In this case d∗ = 2, with {θ53, θ282} supporting the solution together with
the SoC constraint which is binding in this case. This is shown by the plane
in transparent blue, representing all aggregate strategies fulfilling σ(x)|t=1+
σ(x)|t=2 =
∑
i∈N Ei over the considered time interval. Constraints on the
power rate Pi are not active, and omitted for clarity.
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Fig. 4. Empirical validation of the a priori result of Theorem 11. The
plot shows the average compression set cardinality d∗ observed over 50
trials, corresponding to different randomly generated cases corresponding to
different values of n and M . In all cases, d∗ is bounded by n, and hence
also by the theoretical bound (n+ 1)N .
analysis. The proposed approach was demonstrated on the
charging control problem for a fleet of electric vehicles.
Current work is concentrated towards relaxing the unique-
ness requirements underpinning the compression set quan-
tification of Section V for the class of aggregative games.
Moreover, for the class of EV games under study we aim at
investigating the potential of using the support rank concept
[46] to reduce the conservatism of the a priori certificate.
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